By Kate Starbird, Melinda McClure Haughey, Rachel Moran-Prestridge, Danielle Lee Tomson, Emma S. Spiro, and Michael Grass
Center for an Informed Public
University of Washington
This article is the first of a series of “What to Expect in Election Rumoring” posts about the 2024 U.S. general election, drawn from insights gained through previous and current research, contextual knowledge, and consultation with community partners. Among other outputs, this series from the Center for an Informed Public (CIP) at the University of Washington will feature articles introducing conceptual tools for understanding election rumoring (both in general and specifically in online settings) and for anticipating the types of rumors and tactics that we expect to see during different phases of the upcoming election. This article is also crossposted to the CIP’s Election Rumor Research Substack newsletter.
In this first article of the series, we outline eight distinct phases of the election process. Each phase contains events that shape information dynamics. These phases consider the: (1) nature and pacing of election-related events; (2) levels of uncertainty, informational ambiguity and anxiety; (3) attention dynamics (online and within media); and (4) varying known tactics of political maneuvering and information manipulation.
Background: Rumoring About Election Administration
Our election rumor research — and therefore this article — focuses explicitly on rumoring about election administration.
We define rumors as unverified or contested claims or stories spreading through informal channels. We define rumoring as the collaborative process of generating, evolving, and spreading rumors. Importantly, though many people think of rumors as inherently false, rumors can turn out to be true or contain a kernel of truth. The veracity of some may never be resolved. Even when false, rumors often reflect sincere confusion and/or real concern among a population. Conceptualizing unverified and potentially false stories as rumors allows researchers (as well as journalists and election officials) to begin the work of understanding the underlying claims and analyzing their spread before veracity and intent can be determined.
We focus exclusively on rumors about election administration — i.e., rumors about the processes, procedures, and materials of registering to vote, voting, tabulating votes, and certifying the election. These include:
- Rumors that could lead to disenfranchisement (e.g., about when, where, how to vote or the status of polling locations).
- Rumors that could contribute to diminished trust in election processes and/or results.
- Rumors that could motivate changes in election law and administration that make elections less secure, less efficient, and more prone to rumoring and distrust.
Though rumors about election administration can take shape as unsubstantiated speculation or allegations, most often in our experience these rumors emerge from real election-related events and occurrences — a registration form mailed to the wrong location, ballots found discarded in a trashcan, pens bleeding through ballots, machines malfunctioning on Election Day, a rental vehicle used to transport ballots — that are misinterpreted, mischaracterized, or framed in misleading ways.
In previous work, we described 10 factors that contribute to the potential virality of a rumor — including underlying conditions such as uncertainty and diminished trust in information providers, as well as specific features of a rumor, such as novelty, familiarity, and the compellingness of “evidence” supporting it. Here, we additionally consider how different events in specific phases of the electoral timeline impact informational conditions – such as degree of uncertainty, speed of news, or potential for emotional activation – and thus the nature of rumoring. Specific events within each phase also afford both novel “evidence” to spark new rumors (and reignite old ones) and attentional opportunities to spread them. Understanding what the phases are and how information conditions vary across them can therefore be valuable for anticipating the rumors that might arise and spread.
Seven Phases of Election Administration Rumoring
Election rumoring can be mapped across eight phases (often overlapping in time) that correspond to different dimensions of election administration: establishing procedures, voter registration and roll maintenance, distribution of mail-in ballots, early in-person voting, Election Day voting, vote tabulation, election certification at local, state, and congressional levels, and Inauguration Day. The table below lists the eight phases with approximate timing for the 2024 election.
Times are approximate because, in contrast to how elections work in much of the rest of the world, elections in the U.S. are distributed across thousands of different jurisdictions. Laws guiding the voting and vote-counting processes — and consequently the rules about when to register, mail ballots, and vote in person — vary at both the state and local levels. This complexity means that the phases for our timeline are approximate rather than precisely mapped to specific dates. This complexity is also a significant contributor to election rumoring in the U.S. — something we will note repeatedly in this article and in future ones.
Each phase encompasses distinct events and is accompanied by different informational dynamics, which determine the kinds of rumors that we expect to see as well as potential tactics for intentionally manipulating those information spaces. Here, we briefly describe each phase, highlight some of the events that we expect to become entangled in rumors, describe some of the accompanying information dynamics, and note some of the known tactics of information manipulation that we anticipate at these times.
Please note that our descriptions of the early phases have more detail than later ones. We intend to add additional details about the information dynamics, events, rumor types, and exploitation tactics of the later phases as we progress through the election cycle.
Phase 0: Election Infrastructure Updates
Phase 0 is the period between elections. During this time, states may pass new laws about when, where, and how to vote. State and local election officials may put into place new processes for voting, vote-counting, and ensuring election integrity. They may change the materials they use or the pens they recommend for paper ballots. They may update the software or machines they use for printing, registering, and/or tabulating votes. Some of these changes, such as Maricopa County, Arizona, shifting to heavier paper in 2022 and several states abandoning ERIC (a program which helps maintain voter rolls), may be motivated by false rumors in past election cycles.
The information space is relatively slow-moving during this time, punctuated by the passing of new laws, announcements from election officials about new processes, the filing of lawsuits challenging aspects of the election process, and publicity efforts (e.g., press releases or other media events featuring old rumors) by political operatives and organizations. Events like these might catalyze new rumors or resurface old rumors from past events, primarily among those who have engaged in these rumors before. Partisan media outlets may attempt to capitalize on these events to capture attention from audiences with an appetite for election administration rumors. Political actors may play a role in cultivating these events and the narratives around them. Operatives and activists may engage in spreading false or unsubstantiated rumors about past elections to help motivate and/or justify changes to election processes.
Phase 1: Voter Registration and Roll Maintenance
Registration activities can occur anytime, though there are varying cut-off dates for registering for an upcoming election. Some states close registration a few weeks before the election, while others allow same-day registration on Election Day. Confusion about when and how to register can lead to rumors, both organically and through intentional efforts to disenfranchise voters. In the months and weeks leading up to registration cut-off dates, political parties and civic organizations engage in voter registration drives, which may generate “events” for online discussion, media attention, and (consequently) rumors. Politically-motivated officials may attempt to problematize registration drives, for example by investigating organizers or volunteers for wrongdoing or even filing criminal charges (as we’ve seen recently in Texas). These actions will fuel rumors and may have chilling effects on future registration efforts. Some states allow voter registration by mail, and the mailing of registration materials will create opportunities — new “evidence” — for emergent rumors, such as when a registration form arrives for someone who no longer lives at an address, or when a registration form is mistaken for a ballot. Concerned citizens may share video or photo evidence of registration issues on social media, including being unknowingly purged from rolls.
Inaccuracies within the voter rolls — both real and perceived — implicate the other rumoring activities in this phase. Voter registration list maintenance is the work done (primarily by election officials) to update the lists of actively registered voters for each jurisdiction. Voter rolls are constantly changing, in part because large numbers of people move, become old enough to vote, die, or change their names between election periods. Inaccuracies can manifest organically (e.g., when a person moves without notifying officials in their past location), or through nefarious activity (e.g., the registering of ineligible voters or through the hacking of systems). Inconsistencies in and confusion about roll maintenance feed rumoring about inaccurate voter rolls, contributing to diminished trust in election administration and results. New rumors about roll maintenance may also emerge from “online sleuths” misinterpreting and/or mischaracterizing publicly available registration data or from political leaders who selectively present and/or strategically frame data about roll maintenance.
Recent trends — such as mass voter challenges and attempts to purge people from the voter rolls — suggest that we are likely to see coordinated efforts to spread and mobilize on top of rumors that exaggerate the frequency and/or impact of ineligible voters on the rolls. We will likely see additional large scale voter purges initiated by election officials and political activists alike. Ironically, these purges can function to feed rhetoric about untrustworthy elections. Political groups may mobilize citizens to “take matters into their own hands” to “clean the rolls” which may result in behaviors that could disenfranchise or intimidate eligible voters. All of these actions could create confusion or even altercations on election day (e.g., when an eligible voter finds they are no longer registered) that seed new rumors.
A significant focus of inaccurate voter rolls rhetoric in 2024 will likely be on non-citizen voters. In this election cycle, there have been repeated efforts by political activists and operatives to amplify evidence to support a narrative that large numbers of non-citizens are registered, registering, or plan to vote. Not surprisingly, some of the recent voter purges, including recent ones in Ohio and Virginia, echoed this same refrain.
Rumors about loose voter rolls persist across the election timeline, though are likely to increase in the weeks leading up to Election Day. Rumors relying upon “evidence” gathered during early phases of the election process may be reanimated in later phases to question the outcome and/or challenge the certification of the election.
Phase 2: Mail-In Ballots in Transit
All states allow some form of mail-in voting. Eight states conduct their elections entirely via mail, 28 states allow “no-excuse” mail-in voting (available to all eligible voters), and the remaining states require absentee voters to meet specific criteria. Timelines for when ballots are mailed and deadlined for their return vary from state to state. Some states require ballots to be postmarked by a certain date, with others requiring ballots be received by a specific time (generally the closing of polls on Election Day). In some states, individuals can choose to return their mail ballots in person. These differences create complexity and genuine confusion that contributes to rumors — accidental or intentional — and can lead to both voter disenfranchisement and diminished trust in the process.
The complex process of mailing millions of ballots, which takes place between early September and Election Day, creates prime conditions for election rumoring. In 2020, our team recorded dozens of rumors about ballots that were lost, found, stolen, discarded, dumped, ditched, and destroyed. In all of the cases we are aware of, these incidents were not intentional efforts to disrupt the election (they had other non-political causes) and had remedies. For example, sometimes postal workers “dump” mail, but not for political reasons. But that contextual information did little to mitigate the rumors that emerged from the “evidence” of errant ballots used to cast doubt on the integrity of the mail-in voting process. Though the rhetoric around mail-in ballots is somewhat less charged in 2024 than it was in 2020 (due to rapid procedural shifts in response to Covid-19), we expect textual reports and photos of errant ballots to seed numerous rumors during the mail-in voting period. Voters may also cite elements of ballot design — such as holes in ballot envelopes that enhance accessibility for low-vision voters — in conspiracy theories about systematic voter fraud. Delays (or perceived delays) in the mailing or receiving of ballots are also likely, especially as Election Day nears, to be the focus of ongoing rumors that the U.S. Postal Service intentionally slows delivery of ballots to harm voters of one political party.
The delivery of millions of mail-in ballots will also fuel rumors about the integrity of voter rolls. Voters may receive two ballots. Ballots — or materials perceived to be ballots — may arrive at locations where the voter no longer resides. An eligible voter may receive no ballot at all. These occurrences will likely be rare, but selective amplification may make them seem widespread. Everyday people will share these experiences online — often accompanied by a photo — where they will feed ongoing rumoring about how mail-in voting and eventually the results of the election cannot be trusted. In many cases, these stories will reflect real issues, though it is possible that fabricated or doctored photos will add fuel to the fire. To the extent these reflect actual (and rare) mistakes, nearly all will have remedies, but corrections and remedies will likely be downplayed or ignored. Rumors that include an element of a perceived non-citizen receiving a ballot are likely to garner heightened attention in this election.
Rumoring during this phase will also focus upon the return of mail-in ballots. We expect to see claims — built upon eyewitness accounts, videos, and whistleblower statements — about “ballot harvesting,” where a single person or organization is accused of collecting multiple ballots and returning them on behalf of others. Like most elements of the election process, laws guiding the practice of allowing someone to return a ballot on behalf of someone else vary state by state, with most states allowing the practice, though with differing stipulations. This variance of what practices are legal and where, creates genuine confusion, opportunity for exploitation, and fodder for false rumors. In recent years, political actors have leaned on rumors of “ballot trafficking” to mobilize volunteers to observe ballot dropboxes — generating more “evidence” (eyewitness accounts and/or videos that are often misinterpreted or mischaracterized to reinforce ballot harvesting rumors), and leading to potential altercations (between observers and postal workers) or intimidation of eligible voters. Again, we may see a dynamic where rumors (of voter fraud) generate new events (altercations with poll observers) that spark new rumors (of observers being blocked).
Phase 3: Early In-Person Voting
Most states offer some form of early in-person voting. However, the dates for early in-person voting vary from state to state, and the times and location vary from county to county. This complexity can lead to real confusions and intentional deceptions about when and where to vote, as well as unfounded rumors about the legality and security of early voting.
Though the timing will vary across geography, each early in-person voting opportunity has the potential to fuel rumors. Things may go wrong, especially as election officials roll out new processes. Voting and tabulation machines may experience glitches. Pens may bleed through ballots. Expectant voters may be turned away at the polls. A voting location may need to close due to an emergency, maintenance issue, or actual threat of violence. Voters will share these experiences on social media — or through reporting infrastructure set up by political parties that will post them online — where news-brokering online influencers will quickly amplify this “evidence” to fit prevailing frames of a “rigged” or “untrustworthy” election. Though overall attention on in-person voting will likely be low (compared to Election Day), partisan actors and conspiracy theorists committed to spreading rumors about elections have fewer focal points before Election Day, thus potentially raising the risk profile for those locations.
In-person voting provides many “mini” election days that are rumoring warm-ups for November 5. For example, politically-motivated election observers may (mis)interpret election officials to be acting strangely, see suspicious vehicles in the surrounding area, or (mis)perceive a voter to be ineligible (e.g., a non-citizen). Where these stories are shared online, often through “friend-of-a-friend” mechanisms, they have the potential to spread widely as rumors. Observers may also come into conflict with election officials, generating grievance-based accounts of being denied the ability to observe, feeding additional rumors of a “cover up.” Reports of politically motivated observers at voting locations may intimidate eligible voters, leading to voter suppression. All of these dynamics are likely to be seen on Election Day as well.
Though unlikely, reports of hacking or other election interference by a foreign government — even if those reports are untrue or if the impact is minimal — could exacerbate rumoring during the early voting period.
Phase 4: Election Day
Election Day in the U.S. is November 5, 2024. From the time of this post – more than two months away – a lot of things could change that would shift what we expect on Election Day and beyond. Additional information from political polls could enhance or reduce the uncertainty of the outcome, which would moderate the potential for rumors. Unexpected events, such as foreign interference or an act of political violence, could vastly disrupt elections and the information space around them. Given the information landscape changes rapidly, we intend to update our insights as Election Day nears.
Many of the rumoring dynamics of Election Day voting will look similar to early in-person voting, except greatly amplified. There will be more attention, more attention seekers, higher anxiety, higher stakes, and consequently more rumors. From the moment that polls open, online influencers (both established and aspirational) and partisan media outlets will scour social media feeds looking for rumors to amplify, especially rumors with tangible “evidence” to support claims of a rigged election or untrustworthy results. Motivated by some of the same attentional dynamics, journalists will feature reports of voting issues and concerns (legitimate or unfounded) of Election Day voters. Though attention will be high, it will also be diffuse, with some focused on their local elections, some on swing states, some on the most novel and potentially impactful stories, such as an issue with voting machines used in many locations.
The number of voters — and the number of things that can go wrong with the in-person voting process — will be exponentially higher on Election Day. Machines and processes that worked smoothly during early in-person voting may experience unexpected problems on Election Day. Rumors of long lines may emerge organically or be strategically spread to deter voters. Rumors that carry threats of violence — based on real fears as well as manufactured ones — could suppress turnout and feed narratives of rigged or unfair elections.
In recent years, the political organizations associated with presidential candidate Trump and the Republican Party have established infrastructure for voters to report problems (real and perceived) with election day voting — via phone or an online form. At their best, these reporting structures allow for the rapid identification and mitigation of real voting issues, contributing to a more secure and robust process. At their worst, they provide a stream of “evidence” that can be misinterpreted, mischaracterized, and/or mis-contextualized to rapidly seed and spread misleading rumors and conspiracy theories about election administration.
The temporality of election rumors will depend both upon the features of specific rumors and the broader arc of the election. Some rumors will resolve quickly, especially those that are easily corrected. Other rumors may persist for days, or, if conditions are right (e.g. a potentially contested election), for weeks, months, and even years.
Phase 5: Vote Processing and Tabulation
The vote-counting process begins as soon as the polls close on the evening of Election Day. However, like just about everything else in U.S. elections, the timing of when votes are officially counted and how long those counts take varies from state-to-state — ranging from days to weeks. Results in states with limited mail-in voting often come more quickly. For states where a large percentage of the population votes by mail, the specifics of when mail-in ballots are due and how they are processed and counted can differ significantly. Some states require ballots to have arrived by the end of Election Day; others only require that they are postmarked by that date. Some states allow pre-processing of mail-in ballots, which means that ballots that have arrived before Election Day are ready to be counted on election night. Other states delay the processing of mail-in ballots until after the polls close, which slows down the tabulation process and results in the mail-in ballot counts lagging behind the Election Day (and early in-person) vote counts.
This variation and complexity of vote counting contributes to confusion that bolsters rumoring and conspiracy theorizing about the integrity of the process. Slow counts — though reasonable considering the complexity of the process — extend the period of uncertainty and generate more opportunity for rumors to appear and metastasize. In places where mail-in ballots are counted at different rates from in-person ballots, demographic differences in who chooses to vote by mail create the potential for significant shifts in vote share as the different types of ballots are counted. These “red mirage/blue wave dynamics” can be perceived or intentionally mischaracterized as indicative of election fraud.
The tabulation process provides myriad opportunities for rumoring. Most of the public does not fully understand the intricacies — and layers of security — around how ballots are processed, verified, counted, documented, and (in some cases) recounted. Paper ballots are often transported (sometimes in rental vehicles) from individual polling stations to central vote tabulation locations. Electronic voting machines and tabulation machines may require a technician to print out or download data to be aggregated elsewhere. Transparency mechanisms — such as volunteer observers and live-streamed video — can be important for ensuring a secure and trustworthy election, but they can also lead to misinterpretation and/or misrepresentation of vote counting processes and false allegations of fraud. Periodic updates of vote counts can inspire arm-chair statisticians to erroneously infer election fraud. Discrepancies between predicted outcomes (when media “calls” a race) and later official counts can also feed election fraud rumors.
The amount and intensity of rumoring about and during the vote processing and tabulation phase will be profoundly shaped by expected and interim results of the most significant races — i.e., the ones that have the potential to shift power at the national level. Close elections where expected outcomes are hard to predict are likely to spawn more rumoring. Generally, the losing side is more likely to engage in rumoring about the integrity of the election, especially if the loss is unexpected. However, we expect rumoring to be most pronounced among voters who are already primed to believe that elections are rigged.
If candidates who have previously engaged in election denial sense that they might lose, we can expect them (and their supporters) to continue to sow doubt, both by amplifying rumors from Election Day (and prior) and by helping to seed and spread new rumors about the vote counting process. Lawyers and political organizers on the losing side may work to assemble the “evidence” within those “rigged election” rumors to motivate or justify contesting election results. Candidates and political operatives may attempt to leverage rumors to pressure election officials to stop counting. Political organizers may set up rallies and protests that, in some cases, might interfere with vote counting and create altercations that spark additional rumors. Partisan amplification of rumors about allegedly corrupt vote counting processes could lead to threats and intimidation of election officials. Announcements about lawsuits and election challenges will further fuel the rumor mill.
Phase 6: Certification: Local, State, and Congressional
The next phase of the election is certification, which progresses through multiple stages — from local election officials to state canvassing boards, to Secretaries of State, to state electors, and then to the U.S. Congress.
Key dates include:
- November ~12-27: Local officials certify the final vote counts and send them to state officials.
- December 11: States issue Certificates of Ascertainment.
- December 17: Electors vote in their states.
- December 25: Electoral votes must be received by the President of the Senate and Archivist.
- January 6: Congress counts electoral votes.
Historically, local election officials have tabulated votes, certified them, and passed them up the chain without issue. But the events of 2020, including reluctance by some local officials to certify, an influx of politically partisan election officials (some of whom have engaged in election denialism), ongoing rhetoric about “rigged elections,” and recent changes to the laws around certification (e.g., in Georgia) suggest that certification may not go smoothly in 2024.
In close elections with national impact, or ones where the losing side has previously engaged in election denialism, it is possible that we will see political candidates, operatives, activists, and influencers pressure local and state election officials, electors, and members of Congress to not certify the election. Political activists may organize rallies and protests to increase that pressure on election officials, as we saw in 2020 (and 2000). It is likely that false rumors that emerged during earlier phases of the election will be leveraged to motivate or justify resistance to certification. And it is possible that the activation of political partisans using false rumors will inspire threats or even acts of violence.
Temporarily, we are likely to see an uptick in election rumoring around certification dates for key races and the convening of electors in swing states. Actions by officials to resist certification or challenge results could lend additional credence to false rumors. Delays in certification at the local level can disrupt the process at later stages. That said, in all cases where officials have tried to not certify they have failed, whether by being forced to certify by the courts or otherwise. Informal audits, ostensibly to identify errors or fraud, could introduce more uncertainty, e.g., by interrupting the chain of custody for ballots, and reduce the trustworthiness of the results.
New laws that clarify the Congressional certification process limit the potential for some of the political maneuvers that we saw on January 6, 2021. That said, there are still opportunities for disruption that will likely be motivated by and contribute to rumoring around that date.
Phase 7: Post-Certification / Inauguration
The period between congressional certification and inauguration has historically been a calm one — 2020 broke the mold. With the election still two months away, it is difficult to predict what we might see during this time. Rumoring is likely to decline after the certification by Congress — if things run smoothly and the tabulated winner is certified. If certification stalls or there is some other outcome, we can expect a great deal of turmoil in the information space and beyond.
If high-profile candidates and those who operate the political infrastructure that supports them (including online influencers and partisan media) choose to engage in election denial, we are likely to see continued rumoring, coalescing around the most prominent and difficult to debunk or explain allegations of fraud. We are also likely to see arguments referencing the large number of election related rumors — ignoring their corrections — as “evidence” of either widespread fraud or distrust in the system. It is possible that we could see these rumors used to mobilize protests or inspire political violence. The likelihood of different scenarios will likely become more clear as election season progresses, though some things — such as political violence — are very hard to predict.
Coming Up Next
In future posts in our “What to Expect When We’re Electing” series, we plan to go deeper into some of the rumors and dynamics described in this timeline piece. We anticipate future posts will include topics such as:
- The Five Moves of Misleading Election Rumors
- Common Themes and Tropes of Election Rumors
- Tactics of Strategic Manipulation of Information Spaces
- The Fragmented and Changing Information Space and Methods for Studying It
- Tips for Journalists Covering Election Rumors
Posts in this series will be in addition to the rapid research posts we write in reaction to emerging rumors online. We will also be developing other posts in this series as we progress through the election timeline.
Additional Resources
Protect Democracy outlines a similar timeline to ours in a useful graphic here. The New York Times put out an interactive graphic showing the exact dates for early, mail-in voting, and Election Day voting across different states: here.
The Election Integrity Partnership published a “What to Expect” piece for election day and the vote tabulation period (Phases 4 and 5) in 2020, and a report documenting a wide range of rumors that spread online around the 2020 election.
The Brennan Center for Justice has a variety of resources clarifying common misconceptions and rumors at each phase of the election process.
- Kate Starbird is a Center for an Informed Public co-founder and professor in the UW Department of Human Centered Design & Engineering
- Melinda McClure Haughey is a CIP graduate research assistant and HCDE doctoral student.
- Rachel Moran-Prestridge is a CIP senior research scientist and an affiliate assistant professor at the UW Information School.
- Danielle Lee Tomson is the CIP’s research manager.
- Emma S. Spiro is a CIP co-founder and iSchool associate professor.
- Michael Grass is the CIP’s assistant director for communications.
The Center for an Informed Public would like to thank the Brennan Center for Justice for assistance reviewing this article.